Chapter Two: Approaches to the Study of Emotion
Chapter Two of Fundamentals of Japanese Emotional Experience reviews the broad literature on emotion and attempts to justify the importance of the research on emotion concepts in the psychology of emotion. In this chapter, after a number of different perspectives about the origin and function of emotions are reviewed, I will argue that the evolutionary, physiological, social and cultural aspects of the emotion experience all contribute to the formation of emotion concepts that delineate the emotional experience of the individual. Just as conceptual categories in general would reflect the evolutionary, physiological, and socio-cultural experiences that lie behind the individual’s view of reality (Medin & Ortony, 1989), emotion concepts may also reflect people’s evolutionary as well as socio-cultural past. Emotion concepts may therefore provide a window through which the connection between culture and emotion may be examined. I begin this literature review with general conceptions of emotion, then progress toward brief descriptions of current general approaches to explaining the emotional experience.
THEORIES ON THE NATURE OF EMOTION
General Conceptions of Emotion
The nature of emotion can be conceptualized in various ways, some poetic in form, some using the ‘folk language’ or ‘folk logic’ of the layperson, others attempting to capture the essence of emotion in more abstract, ‘scientific’ forms (Russell, 1991a). Each describes, perhaps, differing aspects of an elusive yet ever present, ubiquitous experience that is emotion. At least in the Western tradition, the academic attempt to explain the role of emotion within the context of human kind’s overall experience could be said to have started with Aristotle (McKeon, 1941) around 300 B. C., who defined emotion as an illogical state accompanied by pleasure or pain. Descartes (1649/1989) saw emotions as consisting of an interaction of the perceptions, desires and beliefs initiated through an ‘agitation’ resulting from the meeting of the animal and spiritual natures within humankind.
The effort to create a comprehensive theory of emotion seemed to have gained most of its momentum during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hume (1888), who was one of the first to advocate the importance of the ‘cognitive‘ element in emotion experience, perceived emotions as resulting from, and occurring within a complex of feelings and thoughts, both of which have concomitant and subsequent effects on each other. Still, in the 19th and early 20th century, a number of researchers, such as Piderit (1867), Darwin (1872/1965), James (1884), Lange (1885), Cannon (1929), McDougal (1928), Watson (1929), have examined emotion from a variety of perspectives emphasizing the evolutionary, physiological, cognitive, and socio-cultural aspects of the emotion experience.
A number of psychologists such as Allport (1954), Arnold (1960), Schacter and Singer (1962), Schacter, (1964), Tompkins (1962, 1963, 1984), Lazarus (1982,1991a, 1991b), Izard (1971), Zajonc (1980), Plutchik (1980), Marsella (1985, 1994), and Staats (1990) have engaged in the study of emotion, each taking a different approach toward, and therefore each emphasizing a different aspect of, the causes, processes, and consequences of emotional experience. One reason for the plurality of theories is that each theorist tends to focus on specific aspects of the emotion experience (de Rivera, 1977, p.34), such as reactions to physiological processes (James, 1890), action tendencies (Arnold, 1960), as one subsystem of personality (Izard (1971, 1977, 1980, 1993), as differing combinations of autonomic and cognitive processes Mandler (1980), as activators and amplifiers (Tomkins, 1984), as modes of adaptation in differing environments (Levenson, 1994), as coded in universal facial expressions (Ekman, 1972), or as neurological circuits (Panksepp, 1992, 1994).
According to Hansell (1989; for other attempts at classifying emotion theories, see Averill, 1992; Scherer & Ekman, 1984), these emotion theories can be categorized into three major general conceptual frameworks or models. One is the epiphenomenon model, which portrays emotion as a side effect to more primary physiological and psychological processes. For instance, emotion may be seen as a manifestation of survival instincts (Darwin, 1872), mere reactions to physiological processes (James, 1890), or possible avenues of discharge for the psychic energy which lies behind the instinctual drives within the subconscious of a person (Freud, 1923).
The information model emphasizes either the neuro-physiological/biochemical or the subjective-experiential aspect of information processing within body or mind. According to this set of theories, emotion precedes and in many cases is the cause of subsequent behavior. Emotion acts as a signaling device to activate mind or body in answer to some important, attention demanding inner or outer situation or event. This model includes, for example, theories describing the neuro-physiological-biochemical role of emotion as preceding and accompanying behavior and as the catalyzing component of energy mobilization in emergencies (Cannon, 1929); theories about communication and survival mechanisms (Plutchik, 1980); and theories of stimuli evaluation, action planning, and communication of the feelings and intent to others in the environment (Scherer, 1984).
The Hedonic model highlights hedonic aspects of emotion, and makes three primary assumptions; 1) hedonic sensations are the catalyst that initiates an emotion; 2) because of the causative relation between sensation and emotion, emotions can be classified along the same lines as sensation, i.e., as being of a pleasant, positive nature reinforcing situations related to a specific pleasant emotion, or of an unpleasant, negative nature, thus negating the desirability of a situation; and 3) the reinforcement process is the primary basis for emotions, and emotions, through reinforcement of behavior, help to shape the process of motivation toward that which is pleasurable and away from that which is unpleasant. For instance, Tomkins (1962, 1963, 1984) and Izard (1980, 1993) are two examples of contemporary theorists postulating a version of the hedonic model of emotion.
In the contemporary literature, however, emotion is typically regarded not just as an epiphenomenon, but as a significant psychological process in its own right. For example, generally combining the elements of information and hedonic models, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981), while listing numerous definitions of emotion from different theorists from various fields of academic endeavor, offered a definition of emotion that may be general enough to include most aspects of the human experience through which emotion may be said to travel:
Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal-directed and adaptive (p. 355).
Another general definition taking into consideration the physiological, evolutionary and socio-cultural aspects of emotion comes from Marsella (1994) in which emotion is defined as:
A biopsychosocial response which varies in frequency, duration, intensity, and complexity as a function of an organism's response to an event. This response begins with sensory input which stimulates the pituitary-hypothalamic-adrenal axis resulting in a state of arousal that signals the organism's reflexive defense, attack, retreat or approach reactions. This arousal state results in a secondary reaction which activates sensory-muscular-affect-cognitive systems that serve the functions of (1) further arousing or relaxing the organism, (2) further activating appropriate response sub- systems of the organism, (3) motivating the organism, (4) cueing and informing the organism, and (5) rewarding and/or punishing the organism
Because of the survival value, the entire process occurs in near simultaneity. Organisms vary in their conscious awareness of the process and in their capacity to impose higher-order and interpretive mechanisms upon it. Further, organisms vary in the intensity and probability that certain primitive arousal states (defense, attack, retreat and approach) will occur as a function of genetics and sociocultural learning. Within this context, internal and external representations of emotion-related behaviours may vary, resulting in incongruent feedback and modulation of the responses within the organism and between organisms (p. 162-3).
These definitions, which are typical of contemporary definitions of emotion, delineate the scope of the contemporary research on emotion as a human phenomenon that is embedded in cognitive and motivational processes, underpinned by physiological processes, and evolutionarily and socio-culturally constituted. In the sections to follow, a general overview is provided about the relationship of emotion with motivation and cognition on the one hand, and with evolutionary and socio-cultural processes on the other hand.
Emotion, Cognition, and Motivation
As can be seen in Kleinginna and Kleinginna’s and Marsella’s definitions, emotion in the contemporary literature is seen as consisting of affective, motivational as well as cognitive aspects, reflecting the Platonic tripartite division of the mind into emotion (appetitive or impulsive element), motivation (the ‘spirit’ that mediates between appetite and cognition), and cognition (reason) (Ryle, 1967). The same tripartite division was reflected in the work of Kant (1793/1951) and the structuralism of Wundt (1988) and Titchener (1988). Nevertheless, theorists differ in their characterizations of the relationships among emotion, cognition, and motivation.
One class of theories conceptualizes emotion primarily in relation to motivation by highlighting the success or failure of goal directed activities toward some biological or social objective. For example, Tomkin’s (1984) Affect Theory sees affective states (emotions) as activators and amplifiers of an innately patterned chain of events consisting of cognition, decision and action, which are the reaction to some biological, environmental, or social stimuli. He stipulates nine ‘innate’ or ‘basic’ emotions that work as biologically patterned responses to specific kinds of stimuli. These nine include four positive emotions such as interest or excitement, enjoyment or joy, surprise or startle, and five negative emotions including distress or anguish, fear or terror, shame or humiliation, contempt and disgust, all of which are accompanied by specific physiological reactions and expressions. Buck’s (1984) communication theory too highlights emotion’s links with motivation processes. According to him, various human expressive behaviors, i.e., verbal, paralinguistic gesture, facial expressions, or other forms of body language expressed through the central nervous system communicate the individual’s disposition, motivations, and intentions, thus facilitating harmonious social interactions.
A second class of theories conceptualizes emotion primarily in relation to cognition. For instance, in Mandler’s (1980) theory, emotions result from a combination of autonomic and cognitive processes. In this theory, autonomic arousal alerts the cognitive processes that then go through a process of appraising and reacting to various stimuli in the environment. This kind of cognitive/emotion process is also found in theories about the close interplay between the developmental aspect of emotion and that of cognition. In early development, emotions tend to arise out of a tension resulting from persistent environmental stimulation over time. As cognitive capacity grows, emotions become the result of both tension and a cognitive interpretation of the tension producing stimuli; a cognitive appraisal made possible through the infant’s growing ability to perceive more complex meaning of environmental stimuli in relation to the self (Sroufe, 1984).
Other cognitive theorists of emotion emphasize thought processes leading up to the initiation or ‘triggering’ of the emotion experience (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). These authors speculate that the individual’s ‘thought processes’ are defined as originating from one or more of three aspects of the world, 1) events and the individual’s interpretation of the event, 2) the cause or ‘agent’ that brings some event into being, and 3) objects. Cognitive interpretation of one or more of these ‘events’ in the world results in an emotion experience.
Nevertheless, many theories regard emotion as one of the tripartite division of psychological processes, which are closely linked with each other. For instance, Lazarus (1991a,b) advocated a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion that analyzes the individual’s constant concern with appraising and coping with the physical and social environments. Emotion always involves cognition, i.e., decision-making processes evaluating others, the individual's relationships with others, and attempts at coping with the harms and benefits within any environment. Two kinds of appraisal deal with 1) relevance of the interaction for one's goals and degree of ego involvement or commitment (primary appraisal), and 2) decisions regarding blame or credit and one's own coping potential (secondary appraisal). Multiple motivations and goals within any particular encounter result in the possibility of several emotions occurring simultaneously.
Emotion: Evolutionarily or Socio-Culturally Originated?
Although both cognitive and motivational processes are involved in emotion experience in the contemporary literature, some theorists emphasize evolutionary origins of emotion, while others stress the importance of socio-cultural influences. First of all, theories that emphasize evolutionary origins of emotion tend to conceptualize emotion as integral to adaptive psychological processes, which have resulted from adaptations to the environment. For instance, Psychoevolutionary theory (Plutchik, 1994, p. 98-9), drawing on Darwin’s (1872; 1965) conception of emotion, stipulates that emotions are ‘communication and survival mechanisms… consisting of complex chains of events with feedback loops that help produce and stabilize behavioral homeostasis’. This feedback process consists of a four stage sequence: 1) cognitive evaluation of events in relation to the mental or physical wellbeing of the individual, 2) if cognitive evaluation judges the stimuli as significant to the concerns of the individual, various feelings and physiological changes are evoked, which are expressed as 3) anticipatory reactions, that are actions geared toward fulfilling or changing the situation in an effort to 4) neutralize the original stimulus trigger.
By contrast, there is a viewpoint that stresses the socio-cultural origin of emotional experience. Social constructionists view emotion through the complex structure of the individual as a social phenomenon. Emotion is perceived as a temporary, transient social role consisting of cognitive appraisal of a situation in relation to a socially constructed environment, the elements of which play pivotal roles in the elicitation, delineation, and expression of an emotion (Averill, 1991; Harre, 1986; Oatley, 1993). Similarly, Griffith (1997, p.143) describes the ‘social concept model’ as embodying the insight ‘that a key part of emotional ‘competence’ in a culture is knowing when to emote as well as how to emote.’
Continuing this line of thought, Averill, (1991, p. 158) states…’an emotional role is (in part) a rule-determined pattern of behavior. Knowing the rules that constitute an emotional role is an important aspect of having the relevant schemas for enacting the role. ’Emotional roles are expressed and experienced within a social environment and thus are regulated by the social structure within which they find expression. Specific ‘rules’ inherent within the social structure regulate the emotion process. Averill defines ‘rule’ as consisting of constitutive, regulative, and procedural aspects. Constitutive refers to the aspect of a rule that delineates the borders dividing behavior belonging to differing emotion states, i.e., anger or happiness. Regulative pertains to acceptable behavior within any one specific emotion state; and procedural refers to the skillfulness, in terms of knowledge of strategies and tactics with which each emotion state may be deployed within any specific social situation. Each of the above ‘rule aspects’ may apply to various stages/aspects of the emotion episode; appraisal, behavior, prognosis, or attribution (Averill, 1991, p.159-60). Thus the emotion episode is seen as embedded in a social matrix; of individuals relating to one another within a cultural social context; and as such, the emotion process is necessarily defined by and regulated through social rules, regulations, and conventions.
Oatley (1993, p. 344) contrasts social constructionism with cognitive models of emotion and states that ‘The social-constructionist approach… has extra components beyond those usually found in cognitive constructions. The extra components include the prescriptive force that folk theories of emotions have, and the social purposes they accomplish.’ The social constructionist approach goes into much detail as to the prescriptive rules and regulations that help define the folk theories of emotion, and of the many, varied personal and social functions found within an emotion episode. According to social-constructionism, emotional episodes are, for the most part, played out on a social stage, i.e., within a social environment, and are the result of present or past interactions with others.
Nevertheless, there is a class of theories that acknowledge the significance of both evolutionary and socio-cultural influences on emotion. For instance, Frijda (1986) accents the evolutionary origin of the cognitive, functional processes eliciting emotion by stipulating that emotions have a function, i.e., to institute action readiness and change, in order to deal with life emergencies and the achievement of satisfaction. Nevertheless, he views socio-cultural processes as significantly shaping the experience and expression of emotion. Additionally, in a series of articles, Frijda (1986), Mesquita and Frijda (1992), Mesquita, Frijda, and Scherer (1997) have presented a balanced view on emotion acknowledging the importance of both evolutionary and socio-cultural influences. From the socio-cultural side, the authors describe the import of sometimes culturally unique ‘salient concerns’ on the individual, social, and cultural levels, upon the delineation of the emotional experience. The nature of these ‘concerns’ can be classified into categories described as ‘components’ or ‘stages’ in the emotion process, the precise definitions for which may vary within differing cultures as a result of differing environmental conditions, or socio-cultural foci. For example, antecedents of emotion experience might vary as a product of social or physical conditions, or spiritual beliefs (Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997, p. 271). Additionally, each of the various components or stages is further divided into dimensions reflecting a more detailed area of emotional meaning where socio-cultural variation might occur. This framework for the analysis of emotional experience is presented in more detail in the next section.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR APPROACHING CULTURE AND EMOTION
This section begins to conceptualize the relationship between culture and emotion, and also to consider an approach to this relationship. First, Mesquita and Frijda’s conceptual framework is described, which has been used to conceptualize the relationship between culture and emotion. An examination of this framework points to the significance of cognitive appraisal of emotional situations as a first process that initiates and sets the tone of an emotional experience. A further discussion is then provided to argue that cognitive appraisal processes involve the activation of emotion concepts, which are in turn likely to be strongly shaped by socio-cultural processes.
Mesquita and Frijda’s Conceptual Framework of Emotion
As with other current theorists of emotion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966, 1991a; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 1982, 1984a,b), Mesquita and Frijda (1992; Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997) postulated basic stages in the emotion process. According to them, there are seven stages or sub-processes of an emotional experience, which can vary relatively independently of each other from one culture to another. Nonetheless, their assumption is that they are universally applicable conceptual stages, which can provide a conceptual framework in which to consider the relationship between culture and emotion.
The first stage is that of the antecedent event; the situational happening that acts as a catalyst, initiating the sensory or cognitive sequence resulting in specific emotions.
The second stage is that of event coding. In any one culture, a specific situation may be sociologically and psychologically coded in ways that reflect the mores, ethics, ideals, and ‘ways of thinking’ that make up the overall shared belief system of the culture. Each culture focuses upon specific events or aspects of events as being especially meaningful for the culture’s inhabitants’ shared view of reality. The focality of a particular culture will help determine the emotions elicited by any one event and help to mold the ensuing emotional and behavioral experience.
Cultural focalization upon one situation or aspect of a situation over others produces within the individual an emotionally charged demand for attention upon that aspect, which results in a more structured, finer discrimination of detail of the situation. Situations that are thus culturally focalized are termed event types. Examination of event types within a specific culture are telling clues as to the nature of the shared schemata or belief system which lies at the basis of emotional behavior in any one situation.
The third stage encompasses emotional appraisal. Once the attention of the individual is focused upon a specific event type, the individual then appraises the situation (as perceived, that is, culturally encoded) relative to his/her own well-being as well as the possibilities for coping with the situation if it is in any way threatening.
The fourth stage of emotional experience entails the autonomic, physiological reaction that results from a given perceived situation and that accompanies the experience of the emotion. Expectations of specific physiological changes accompanying specific emotions tend to intensify emotional experience and reinforce the delineation of the emotion/physiological pairing.
From the state of concomitant physiological reaction and emotion resulting from the emotional and cognitive appraisal of a culturally coded and perceived antecedent event, comes the fifth stage, a state of action readiness. Action readiness describes the state within which the individual is poised to enact some action that either modifies the relationships between the individual and another (resulting from negative appraisal) or sustains the relationship or relationships between the individual and others (positive appraisal) highlighted by the antecedent event. Different emotions elicit differing types of action readiness, depending upon the situational reorientation or lack thereof needed to change the situation into one that best serves the perceived needs of the individual (Frijda, 1986).
Action readiness culminates in the sixth stage, an emotional behavior. Action tendencies result in behavioral generation based upon expected effectiveness of specific behavioral patterns taken from the subject's general repertoire of culturally delineated possible behaviors. Within the experience of emotional behavior is the necessity for regulation, the seventh and final stage. Regulation refers to the inhibition or enhancement of specific emotions as a means of influencing the outcome of a given situation and/or one’s reaction to the situation.
The Mesquita-Frijda framework suggests that culture may shape emotion processes at every stage of emotion experience. However, it points to the cognitive processes and appraisal in particular (stages 2 and 3) as important in the analysis of the relationship between culture and emotion. This is because the event coding and emotion appraisal play the most important role in the activation of an emotion, the determination of which particular emotion is activated within any given situation, and the enactment of subsequent emotion regulation. I will call conceptual knowledge that helps people do just these things emotion concepts.
Emotion Concepts
Emotion concepts are defined here as conceptual knowledge structure that cognitively triggers an emotional experience, helps people appraise events and recognize the experience as an experience of a certain emotion such as anger and happiness, and help them regulate their actions accordingly.
It is true that various theorists have postulated that an emotion episode can be triggered by a number of mechanisms. However, common among theories concerning the trigger of an emotion experience is an appraisal process, which entails a conceptual interpretation of the current state of affairs. For example, Perhaps, as postulated by Izard’s (1977) differential emotions theory, four different systems, including a cognitive system, can act individually or together to activate an emotional experience. The neural source, in which specific neurotransmitters elicit emotion; the sensory motor source in which emotions are activated by efferent or motor messages; the motivational source of emotion activation that derives from various drive states both physiological and emotional; and the cognitive source, which tends to be the more complex and versatile source of emotional states. Some theorists have placed a primary significance on cognitive processes. For example, according to Lazarus (1991, p. 819), adaptational encounters result in cognitive evaluations of person-environment relationships which then triggers an emotion experience.
In emotion theories, cognitive appraisals are often postulated to be made with regard to a set of dimensions, and different combinations of various appraisals would elicit different but specific emotions (Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997; Ortony & Turner, 1990). There are several attempts at specifying dimensions or components of appraisal. Although there is no single list of appraisal dimensions that all theorists agree on, there appears to be some convergence among theorists. A number of researchers (Frijda 1986; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984a,b; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985: Mauro, Sato and Tucker (1992); Mesquita and Frijda, 1992) list varying combinations of the following appraisals including positive or negative valence, feelings of uncertainty or certainty, causation by someone else or the self (agency), outcome uncertainty, anticipated effort, perceived goals of an individual (intentionality), goal/need conduciveness, goal/path obstacles, coping ability, legitimacy (norm compatibility/incompatibility), controllability of situations important to the individual, and change in perception of status or change in self-esteem. These dimensions may be embedded in emotion concepts that help people cognitively appraise emotional situations.
As Scherer, Wallbott and Summerfield (1986) noted, it is possible that the above list of possible appraisals resulting in an emotional experience vary in their importance as activators of emotion within any specific culture. Furthermore, the emotion states that result from one or another appraisal or set of appraisals may depend to a large extent on the relationship between the meaning of emotion concepts and socio-cultural belief systems. In the next section, I will argue that culture is one of the major influences in the shaping of emotion concepts.
Emotion Concepts and Culture
William James, in the final paragraph on emotions in his Principles of Psychology states:
This is all I have to say about emotions. If one should seek to name each particular one of them of which the human heart is the seat, it is plain that the limit to their number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the seeker, each race of men having found names for some shade of feeling which other races have left undiscriminated. If we should seek to break the emotions, thus enumerated, into groups, according to the their affinities, it is again plain that all sorts of groupings would be possible, according as we chose this character or that as a basis, and that all groupings would be equally real and true (James, 1890/1981, p. 1097).
This description by James brings to mind a picture of the presently available potential of emotional experience as a continuous spectrum, a spectrum of specific qualities of emotional experience, one nuance of quality blending smoothly, qualitatively into the next. The spectrum of emotion has also been compared to the spectrum of color with differing colors representing the conceptual division of emotion into a potentially infinite spectrum of discreet entities resulting from individual and socio-cultural differences in experience (Van Geert, 1995). Separation within any one part of the spectrum of emotion into categories with lexical tags such as anger, happiness, etc. result from conceptual interpretation of emotional experience into cognitive schemas based upon semantic parameters such as agency, voluntariness, and duration (Wierzbicka, 1994), or social interaction and context (Wozniac, 1986).
Medin and Ortony (1989, p. 186) have proposed that there is a close relationship between conceptual knowledge, i.e., how people think about and interpret their environments and their experience within an environment, and the historical evolutionary, socio-cultural experience of humankind. Thus it might be expected that conceptual categories of an individual, i.e., the individual’s view of reality, would reflect the evolutionary, physiological, social and cultural experiences of human kind in general, as well as the more specific socio-cultural experience of that individual.
In line with this reasoning, Stein, Trabasso, and Liwag (1993) suggested that there is a close relationship between conceptual systems, cognitive processes, and the activation of emotion. They perceive the role of cognition in as the ability to detect change in one’s inner states and outer environment, and the fundamental necessity of a value system and its accompanying attractions and aversions designed to maintain positive states of ‘being’. The authors speculate that emotions are caused by ‘unexpected precipitating events’, originating from the environment, the actions of another or oneself, and memories. These events are evaluated as to whether they match or mismatch with current belief/value systems. Mismatches sometimes initiate cognitive evaluations of the event or one’s belief systems, a process that, in conjunction with autonomic nervous system arousal, results in an emotional state (also see Mandler, 1980).
Although there exists a set of emotion lexicons that can be readily translated from English to other languages (Tanaka & Osgood, 1965; Levy, 1973: Ekman, 1972; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986; Tzeng, Hoosain, & Osgood, 1987; Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer & Wallbott, 1988), the size, complexity of nuance, and character of emotion lexicons may differ from one culture to the next as a product of the type and quality of emotional experience specific to that culture, a type and quality that can be captured within the dynamism of the socio-cultural context, a context that is reflective of the unique character of that culture (Russell, 1991; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992).
As a number of theorists maintained (e.g. Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986; Russell, 1991b; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Shweder, 1993), if the above assumptions hold, a conceptual domain is likely to be more complex if the domain is important for a given culture. The amount and quality of nuance of emotion surrounding any one lexical item within the emotion lexicon of a given culture should reflect the cultural complexity relative to that item. For example, if harmonious social relations are of paramount importance within a society, emotions relating to social relations should be more complex and of finer divisions of semantic nuance than emotions relating to social relations in societies that emphasize the needs of the individual over the needs of society.
Thus to summarize, there exists a spectrum of emotion, possibly infinite in its potential size and complexity, with each culture sampling from the spectrum the qualities of emotion and emotional nuance that most ably reflect the structure and processes of individual, social, and cultural experience of that culture. Since concepts and conceptual categories contain cognitive representations of the emotional experience of the individual as well as the individual’s perception of the socio-cultural environment, the study of concepts, in particular emotion concepts, may help illuminate the structures and processes underlying emotion experience, as well as the socio-cultural contexts within which emotional experiences are embedded. It is through investigation of the content and structure of Japanese emotion concepts that I hope to shed light on the connection between culture and emotion.
CONCLUSION
Emotion has been approached variously, but now is recognized as reflecting both evolutionary and socio-cultural influences and is often seen as one component of the tri-partite division of mental processes which interacts with cognition and motivation. From the evolutionary origins of emotion emphasizing appraisal and adaptation, to the developmental interplay between cognition and emotion in infants, and onward to the relationship between motivational drives, social environment and emotion, the role of cognition and the conceptual frameworks through which cognition fulfills its interpretive role in human emotional experience becomes increasingly evident.
Within this context, a number of different perspectives have been discussed on the origin and function of emotions. The various models described above accent differing aspects or stages in the emotion experience. For example, one of the initial stages in a description of the emotion process is the stage of perception and subsequent cognitive categorization of incoming information. Various aspects of the cognitive categorization process are entailed in the perception of the antecedent event, in the culturally defined event coding, in the individual-related appraisal of the incoming information, and in subsequent decision-making processes that lead to behavioral reactions and regulation (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992, p. 180).
Thus, an emotion episode is seen to go through a number of stages from the perception and categorization of antecedent events to behavior and emotion regulation. In conjunction with this, emotion concepts are seen to reflect socio-cultural processes. This is because the emotion spectrum may be continuous, but it is divided into categories that reflect different shades of meaning which reflect the communicative and psychological needs of a culture. In turn, it was suggested that the evolutionary, physiological, and socio-cultural aspects of the emotion experience all contribute to the formation of emotion concepts with which people understand their emotional experiences. As a result, emotion concepts are said to be not only an important determinant within the emotion process, i.e., in their functional relationship to the various stages in the experience of an emotion, but also in the understanding and communication of the emotion experience.
As a result, it might be expected that emotion concepts and conceptual categories could be used to reveal the various dimensions connecting emotion conceptual meaning and the meaning underlying evolutionary and socio-culturally originated belief systems. Conversely, the various components and stages described in the sections above may represent possible cognitive interfaces between emotion experience and the conceptual characterization and cognitive categorization. It is through investigations of components and dimensions within Japanese emotion concepts that I hope to analyze the relationship between culture and the emotional experiences that these concepts represent.
Given the centrality of emotion concepts in this investigation, I now turn to Chapter Three which describes the basic theories on categories and concepts in general and research on emotion concepts in particular.